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INDIA AND THE EUROZONE: A COMMENTARY ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND CORRECTION 
 
BY SHAILAJA FENNELL, AMANDEEP KAUR AND AJIT SINGH 
 
Abstract 
This commentary focuses on the interaction between Eurozone and India with a particular 
focus on the relationship between changes and economic conditions in these two 
jurisdictions. In the pre liberalization world, India and the Eurozone were regarded a priori 
as having little interaction with each other. This story changes with globalization and 
relatively free capital movements. We highlight some of the important changes which have 
occurred in the Eurozone and Indian economies and discuss the implications for other 
regions and countries. The commentary sets out a number of hypotheses and uses broad- 
brush data to provide the intellectual foundations for our analysis.  
  
 
 
The interactions between India and the Eurozone 
 
This commentary is concerned with the evolution of the Eurozone and India in the context 
of globalization and the current serious economic crisis facing the two jurisdictions. A 
careful review of the progress of these two entities in fighting or accommodating the global 
recession is likely to throw some light on the political economy of development in other 
countries and regions. The significance of the Eurozone for the politics and economics of 
Europe cannot be exaggerated. Similarly the experience of India, a mixed economy 
democratic country with all its faults deserves to be reviewed. In the pre liberalization 
world, India and the Eurozone may be regarded a priori as having little interaction with each 
other. However the story changes with globalization and relatively free capital movements. 
In this commentary we will highlight some of the important changes which have occurred in 
the Eurozone and Indian economies and discuss the implications of these changes for other 
regions and countries. The paper will also set out a number of hypotheses which our 
analysis suggests require further explanation. This commentary is not an econometric 
exercise but rather it uses broad- brush data to provide intellectual foundations for the 
more important hypotheses which emerge from our analysis.  
 
The Indian economy has done extremely well between 1990 and 2010. It has been one of 
the fastest growing economies during that period. Recently, it has been growing through an 
uneven patch and its growth rate has declined from over 9 per cent per annum between 
2006 and 2007 to 5.5 per cent per annum in 2012. Although the Indian growth rate is still 
respectable by any relevant international standards, the rating agencies based in New York 
(the Standard and Poor, as well as Moody’s) have been very critical of the lack of deeper 
reforms in the Indian economy.  
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A new pattern of international economic growth is being revealed by the data for the first 
twelve years of the 21st millennium. Despite India’s recent decline in economic growth, 
developing countries in general have been growing at a much faster rate than the 
developed countries. During 2006 to 2011 which includes the deep recession year of 2008, 
the advanced country economies grew at an average rate of 1.63 per cent per annum for 
France, 1.36 per cent for Germany, 0.79 per cent for Japan, 1.9 per cent for UK and 1.8 per 
cent for US. Developing countries, particularly, the leading emerging markets expanded at a 
much faster corresponding rate  of  3.6 per cent for Brazil, 10.2 per cent for China, 7.1 per 
cent for India, 3.5 per cent for South Africa and 5.2 per cent for Russia. France and Germany 
are among the fastest growing economies in the Eurozone.  
 
Even this small sample of countries reveals the extraordinary transformation which has 
occurred in the world economy. It used to be an article of faith among scholars that in a 
global economic downturn it is the periphery which suffers while the centre is able to take 
care of itself. The statistics cited above however reveal an entirely different pattern; it is 
opposite to what has traditionally happened in the past.  
 
The main issues for this commentary are the reasons for the Eurozone’s and India’s 
economic downturn and how these may be related. The two jurisdictions are closely linked 
by trade and capital movements and these links must affect their economic performance. 
One main concern in this paper is to estimate how the economic downturn in the Eurozone 
affects an emerging country like India. This question acquired some notoriety during the last 
two or three years when empirical data showed that the economic cycles in emerging 
countries are more or less synchronized. Similarly the data seems to indicate that the 
advanced countries also had synchronized cycles but of a different kind than that in 
emerging countries. It was speculated that this will help emerging countries to decouple 
their economies from that of advanced countries. Emerging countries were thought to have 
reached a stage where they could control the cyclical fluctuations in their economies. 
However, the Great Recession changed this whole perspective as developing countries were 
directly affected by the fall in aggregate demand in the economic downturn which began in 
its acute form in 2008 with the demise of the Lehman brothers, an important US financial 
institution. However, it must be noted that the slowdown in leading developing countries in 
response to the current recession was short lived.  
 
How economic downturn in the Eurozone affects economic outcomes in India? India, it 
should be noted now has many close ties with Eurozone countries. For this elementary 
exercise, we take Germany and France as the typical Eurozone members and attempt to 
measure the effects of the economic downturn in the Indian economy. The story is 
complicated as India has close relationships in trade and capital movements with Eurozone 
countries. Associated questions which need attention are 1) when is the Eurozone crisis 
likely to end 2) what steps can governments like India’s take to ensure that the economic 
downturn is as short as possible.  
 
 
We start with a broad-brush description of the Indian economy. India is the second most 
populous country in the world and overall during the last quarter century, it has had an 
excellent economic record. It has been on an accelerated growth path which has allowed it 
3 
 
to achieve growth rates of about 9 per cent during the first half of the first decade of the 
new millennium. This fast growth has enabled millions of people to grow out of poverty. 
Although India is the third largest economy in the world in purchasing power parity terms, 
its per capita income is 140th in the world.  
 
From among one of the most closed developing country economies in the 1960s and 70s 
India has become a far more open economy as the following statistics indicate. India’s 
merchandise trade rose by more than three hundred percent between 2006 and 2012. Both 
exports and imports have tripled during this period, with the trade-GDP ratio increasing 
from 30.2 percent to 42.9 percent in 2012. Exports to GDP ratio increased from 12.4 percent 
in 2006 to 16.5 percent in 2006 (Exim bank data). Equally significantly, India’s capital 
account liberalization has led to a large investment of FDI in India and to equally large Indian 
multinational investments abroad. For example, the biggest private sector employer in the 
UK today is the Indian company Tata, employing 45,000 people.  
 
The Eurozone is a big trade partner for India and a fifth of India’s exports find their way to 
the Eurozone region and a sixth of India’s imports come from this region. The nature of 
exports range from agriculture, through manufacturing to services and the Eurozone is also 
important in relation to both incoming and outgoing FDI flows (Anand, Gupta and Dash 
2012). The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany contributed approximately US $9 
billion each to India’s total exports of US $ 26 billion going to the European Union in the 
financial year of 2012, while the total exports to the OECD countries was $46 billion (RBI 
Monthly Bulletin, June 2012). The Netherlands and United Kingdom also benefit from ODI 
outflows from India, receiving 7 and 6 per cent of India’s total outflows of FDI in 2012 (Exim 
Bank data).  
 
The important question that we are asking in this commentary is how would the economic 
crisis in the Eurozone affect Indian economic growth? For purposes of exposition and the 
value of comparison there will also be an examination of the individual impacts of the US 
and the UK. This commentary is not intended to provide a rigorous econometric 
examination of these issues but rather to outline some useful hypotheses and outline an 
intellectual framework to address these questions. We would also like to try to provide a 
serious answer to the question posed by the Indian governor of the Central Bank, ‘when will 
the Eurozone crisis end?’ His answer that it will end on the date of his retirement is amusing 
but not very helpful.  
 
The serious answer is that this will depend most importantly on the politics of the situation. 
In many discussions of the current crisis, the politics of the Eurozone countries is 
overlooked. Yet politics was central to the origin of the Eurozone and in the practical day to 
day working out of the crisis. The design of the Eurozone did not conform to the economists’ 
theories of optimal currency areas. Rather it was the product of the political project of the 
leaders of new Europe after the end of the Second World War. They had two principal aims: 
one was Franco-German reconciliation and the second the necessity of abolishing war 
between nation states in Europe. These aims could only be realized as a process that 
emerges from the rising political costs associated with the growing severity of the crisis 
which the policy makers are concerned with (Glyn et.al. 1998). To illustrate with a concrete 
case, the United States government ushered in the Marshall Plan to deal with the 
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communist threat to their interest in Europe. They were of course extremely successful in 
achieving this objective. The cost of the Marshall Plan amounted to 4 percent of US GDP at 
the time. This was also the foundational argument for the design and implementation of the 
European Common Market, based on the need to ensure growth as a way to reduce the 
possibility of future conflict (Anand, Gupta and Dash 2012). The explicit need for political 
negotiation and accommodation made the economic need to cooperate paramount after 
World War II.   
 
The Existing Analysis of the Impact of the Financial Crisis on Developing Countries  
 
In the first round of analysis on the financial crisis authors agreed that one primary cause of 
the global financial crisis was the under-pricing of risk between 2003 and 2007 that was 
largely generated by the operation of the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States. 
A secondary factor that led to the problem of under-pricing was the inaccurate valuation of 
risks by credit rating organisations. The correction of this under-pricing was regarded as the 
key to resolving the crisis in the early years, and it was felt that while the United States was 
beginning to get this process underway by the end of 2009 there was still a major problem 
of under-pricing risk that needed to be addressed in the Eurozone countries, particularly in 
the United Kingdom (Buiter 2009).  
 
The  initial evaluation of the centrality of the sub-prime mortgage crisis was followed by a 
broader discussion of the financial crisis that manifest itself in 2006-07  and the nature of 
global imbalances in financial flows that were in evidence in the 2000s. The focus in this 
second round was on the political economy of the increased government spending to obtain 
electoral gains alongside a demand for reduced regulation by corporates. The analysis 
indicated that there was a decidedly political nature to domestic policy considerations in 
this decade (Rajan 2011). The use of cheap borrowing to finance macroeconomic balances 
was commonplace in the economic policies followed by OECD countries in the 2000s. The 
nature of economic distortions brought about by these domestic policies, led subsequently 
to a transmission effect through global financial markets to the developing countries 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009).  
 
The conventional wisdom of the time regarded the foremost impact of advanced economy 
country policies of the 2000s on developing countries through transmission effects in 
international trade. This was in keeping with the mainstream trade model that regarded the 
trade balance as a measure of competitiveness of national economies, and therefore 
regarded a fall in financial and trade flows within the global economy as the major cause for 
the reduced growth rates of developing countries. This is also the official rationale for the 
establishment of the Eurozone in 1999, that there was an economic imperative to introduce 
a common currency to improve competition. The political need for integration was not 
explicitly stated in the initial justification of the Eurozone (Anand, Gupta and Dash 2012), in 
a manner strongly reminiscent of the setting up of the European Union half a century 
earlier.  
 
The changes in the trade flows on account of the Eurozone crisis have been examined by 
international financial institutions such as the OECD and World Bank, as an increased deficit 
on the current account balance for developing countries is taken as indication of faltering 
5 
 
growth. A simulation using OECD data estimated that a drop of 1% in export growth in the 
Eurozone could reduce growth rates in low and lower-middle income countries between 
0.4% - 0.5% a year (Massa, Keen and Kenan, 2012).  A second set of data examined on the 
impact of the Eurozone on developing countries is the remittance flows out of the OECD 
countries to developing countries. Remittance flows are regarded as an important 
transmission mechanism for the financial crisis as this source of financial inflows into 
developing countries is an additional source of investment funds. This is regarded as 
particularly significant for the BRICS, where the inflows are regarded as facilitating an 
investment boom and increasing growth rates (Lin 2008). The fall in remittances to 
developing countries after the deep financial downturn raised concerns about the 
transmission mechanism through which the financial crisis would result in lower growth, 
even diminishing incomes and rising poverty in developing countries (Ratra and Mohapotra 
2009, Cali 2009).  The thinking was that the lessening of the growth impetus in the advanced 
economies would have a knock-on negative impact on incomes and economic growth in all 
developing countries.  
 
The treatment of all developing countries as a homogenous group located in the periphery 
and linked to the centre through trade and financial flows in an identical manner is a gross 
simplification of the impact of countries such as China and India on the global economy. A 
common limitation of the current evaluations is that they do not take into account the 
possibility of any impact of developing country domestic policies on the Eurozone or OECD 
countries. Despite the explicit evaluations in the second round of analyses on the financial 
crisis that indicated that the BRICS, and particularly China’s growing saving rate and 
investment in US debt was an important feature, the statistical analysis has tended to look 
at a unidirectional international impact that goes from advanced economies to developing 
countries.  
 
The contrast of financial flows from OECD countries to developing countries against the 
impact of developing country contributions on the capital or current accounts to OECD 
countries could provide an additional direction to understand the impact of the Eurozone 
crisis on India. The reluctance to examine the specific relationships that BRICS, and in 
particular the case of India, have with individual countries within the Eurozone and OECD is 
a consequence of the conventional narrative that regards the global impact of the crisis as 
identical between advanced and developed economies. The limitation of using such a 
narrow conceptual framework is also visible in the analysis of the Eurozone itself, where the 
conventional focus has been of the benefits of a monetary union within the Eurozone, 
without adequate evaluation of the limitations imposed on individual countries by a 
complete inability to use any form of fiscal intervention to improve competitiveness with 
the Eurozone (Dash 2012).  
 
The reality of the Indian contribution to the Eurozone is becoming evident from recent 
statistics released in the Reserve Bank of India. This indicates that the contribution of India 
to global outflows of FDI has seen a considerable increase, from the low number of 37 
projects in other countries prior to 1990, to 415 projects in 2011. Furthermore, the 
percentage of India’s outgoing FDI is the second highest among emerging economies and 
even more than the outflows of Austria, Greece and Ireland within the Eurozone group in 
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2011 (Arockia Baskaran and Charrias, 2012). These statistics underline the importance of 
estimating the contribution of individual BRICS to the trade and financial sectors of 
Eurozone countries. The value of separating out the contribution of individual BRICS 
countries was already signalled by the particularly significant role played by China in global 
financial markets in the 2000s. There has, however, been little commentary on the 
possibility of a reverse flow from BRICS contributing to the adjustment witnessed in 
advanced economies after the financial crisis.  
Furthermore, the global literature on the financial crisis has tended to regard the increased 
savings rates witnessed in developing countries in the 1990s as an additional reason for the 
increased availability of global funds in the years leading to the financial crisis of 2006 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009, Rajan 2010). There was no consideration given to the possibility 
that the deepening of reserves and counter-cyclical policies adopted by the BRICS in 
response to the earlier financial crisis of the late 1990s might be the reason that these 
countries avoided a full-blown financial crisis in the years following 2006.  This buffer built 
by the BRICS could also act as an additional lever to would improve the economic condition 
in the Eurozone and might hasten the introduction of a correction to the Eurozone crisis.  
A recent debate on the ability of developing countries to weather the financial crisis more 
effectively than advanced economies has shed some light on the changing relationship 
between the OECD and Eurozone groups, with groups of developing countries. The IMF has 
identified the possibility that good domestic economic policies are part of the explanation 
for why the periphery has done better than the centre. On the other side, the chief 
economist of the South Centre in Geneva, Yilmaz Akyuz, argues that the good performance 
is due to favourable external factors, such as commodity prices and remittances in the 
2000s (Singh 2013).  The positing of these new arguments about the independent ability of 
developing countries, particularly the savings oriented counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
management evident in the BRICS, does point to the need for more disaggregated analysis 
of the trade and financial flows between BRICS and the Eurozone to understand of the 
financial crisis currently facing the Eurozone and the possible role that India might play in 
future correction and adjustment. 
Finally, the current statistical analysis examining the impact of the Eurozone crisis on trade 
flows and remittances to developing countries, takes an en-bloc approach to all developing 
countries that obfuscates the particular tendencies of low, low-middle and middle income 
countries. Such an aggregation feeds back into the homogenising assumption in 
conventional trade theory that does not recognise structural specificities at the national 
level. The descriptive statistics provided in the next section show the trends in international 
flows between OECD, Eurozone and developing countries, with a particular focus on BRICS. 
The disaggregation of statistics to the level of groups of countries, as well as individual 
country data, permits an analysis of country level trade and financial flow specificities that 
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indicate particular structural relationships in relation to both domestic and bilateral policies 
of trade and investment.  
Descriptive Statistics of Financial and Trade Flows 
Global Trade 
The global trade statistics for the BRICS countries (see Table 1) indicate that while there was 
a considerable downturn in global trade (both goods and services) in 2008-2009, there has 
been a slight improvement between 2010 and 2011. The country that has been most 
adversely affected in India, which has a negative trade account (no data available for 2011). 
In the case of the Chinese economy, there was a major reduction in trade in 2008-09 and 
the trade figures have continued to shrink for 2010 and 2011. There is a sharp contrast with 
the Russian Federation, which has seen the best recovery with the 2011 figure for trade 
being comparable with that for 2008. 
 
Countries 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Brazil 33.8 44.9 46.5 40.0 24.7 25.3 16.9 29.8 
China 32.1 102.0 177.5 263.9 298.1 196.1 181.8 155.0 
India -23.1 -40.5 -57.0 -72.7 -133.9 -89.6 -129.6  .. 
Russian 
Federation 
106.0 142.7 163.4 152.5 200.9 131.0 151.4 193.3 
South 
Africa 
-7.3 -8.0 -15.9 -15.8 -13.6 -9.9 -8.7 -6.8 
Table 1: Global Trade for BRICS countries, Source: OECD Factbook 
Graph 1 below shows that the cumulative trade for BRIC countries in 2011 is almost 
reaching the 2006 level, indicating possible returns to higher trade based growth figures in 
the near future. This descriptive statistic also indicates that the BRICS are recovering while 
the Eurozone is still in recession, making an argument for looking at bidirectional flows 
between the BRICS and the Eurozone and OECD group of countries.  
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Graph 1: Global trade for BRICS countries, Source: OECD Factbook 
Graph 2 shows that the global trade data with the OECD shows a predominantly negative 
trade balance, and the United States continues to have the largest trade deficit. Germany, 
Japan, Ireland and Netherlands baulk the trend, with Germany leading the group with 
regard to maintaining a trade surplus over the entire period. There does not appear to be 
any driver that is pushing this group of countries into recovery, and this descriptive statistic 
is in sharp contrast to the recovery evident in the BRICS in Graph 1. 
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Graph 2: Global Trade for OECD countries, OECD Factbook 
While the global trade statistics already begin to reveal a more heterogeneous story at the 
level of groups of countries, a further disaggregation of the trade balance into merchandise 
and services provides a more detailed picture of the impact of goods and service flows on 
these economies.  
Trade in Goods as a percentage of total OECD merchandise trade 
Graph 3 shows that there has been a continuing growth in the flow of merchandise goods 
between OECD and emerging economies over the period. The graph shows that the greatest 
increase has been in the share of merchandise trade between the OECD and China during 
the period 2005-2009. The trade with India has recovered by 2009 to 2003 levels. The 
overall share of trade with the expanded BRICS has risen from just under 25 per cent in 2003 
to just over 30 per cent in 2009.  
 
Graph 3: Merchandise trade with Non-OECD (also showing individual country 
percentages), OECD Factbook  
Table 2 shows that, in contrast to the growth in trade in merchandise between the OECD 
and BRICS, there has been a fall in the level of merchandise trade within the OECD between 
2002 and 2007. This has also been followed by a stagnant share in merchandise trade during 
2008-2009. This trend is also mirrored at the level of individual countries within the OECD.  
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Israel 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Italy 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.6 
Japan 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.0 
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Korea 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 
Luxembo
urg 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Mexico 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.5 
Netherla
nds 
3.7 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.9 
New 
Zealand 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Norway 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 
Poland 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 
Portugal 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Slovenia 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Spain 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 
Sweden 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 
Switzerla
nd 
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 
Turkey 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
United 
Kingdom 
5.4 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.3 
United 
States 
14.2 12.9 12.1 11.8 11.4 10.6 10.1 10.0 
OECD 
total 
75.3 74.6 73.4 71.7 70.7 70.2 68.1 68.3 
Table 2: Merchandise trade within OECD countries (percentage), Source: OECD Factbook 
Graph 4 shows the continued dominance of the United States in the within OECD 
merchandise trade category. The United Kingdom continues to be the second largest 
beneficiary though it has seen a relative contraction since 2006. Italy and Netherlands are 
next in importance, and slightly outperforming the share of the Japanese share of 
merchandise trade. The inability of individual countries to improve the merchandise trade 
within the OECD indicates that there is a weaker ability of domestic trade policies to 
improve trade performance in the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal than in the BRIC 
countries of China and India. 
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Graph 4: Merchandise trade within OECD countries (percentage), Source: OECD Factbook  
Trade in Global Services  
Graph 5 shows the flow of global trade in services for BRICS countries. The most distinctive 
feature is that India is the only country that has been able to show a trade surplus in 
services. There is clear evidence of fall in the trade surplus after 2008 (no figures available 
for 2011). The global service trade for other countries shows that Brazil and China increased 
their deficit on global service trade (no figures available for China for 2010 and 2011).   
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Graph 5: Global trade in services (net) for BRICS countries, Source: OECD Factfile 
Graph 6 shows the corresponding figure for net trade in global services in OECD countries. 
The trends indicate that a majority of OECD countries have a trade surplus in services.  The 
United States and the United Kingdom show increases in surplus in 2010 and 2011, while 
Germany and Japan show deficits in net trade in global services.  
 
Graph 6: Global trade in services (Net) in OECD countries, Source: OECD Factbook 
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Graph 7 shows that the current account for BRICS countries saw a significant fall after 2008. 
The Indian, Brazilian, and South African economies show a deficit from 2008 (no figures for 
India for 2011). The Chinese economy sees a significant fall in 2008 and a continued 
contraction thereafter, but the Russian Federation sees an improvement in 2011 after the 
impact of a fall in 2008.  
 
Graph 7: Current Account for BRICS countries, Source: OECD Factbook 
Graph 8 shows that the current account for EU countries was negative during 2005-2008, 
and has turned to a surplus in 2011. The figures for the OECD show that there has been a 
negative balance throughout the last decade. In the period after 2008, when there was a 
sharp reduction in the magnitude of deficit, there has been a slow rise in the deficit on the 
current account. For the High Income countries in the OECD, the trend is similar to that of 
the EU. The slightly better performance of the Eurozone countries over that of the OECD 
indicates that there are different bilateral relations with regard to import and export 
partners within these groups of countries. In our earlier discussion we have already 
indicated that particular relationships between individual European countries and India 
have not been adequately identified in the aggregative analysis of statistics that is currently 
in vogue. To provide a serious answer for the nature of the relationship between Eurozone 
countries and India it is important to example bilateral trade relations explicitly.  
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Graph 8: Current Account for OECD and EU countries, Source: OECD Factbook 
Impacts on Remittances 
Graph 9 below uses data provided by the World Bank and shows that India and China were 
not adversely affected by the financial crisis in terms of size of remittance flows during 
2008-2011. Contrary, to the generally gloomy prediction on remittances at the level of all 
the developing economies, these two countries have seen a healthy contribution by inflow 
of remittances.  It would appear that there is a particular need to look at financial flows 
between BRICS and Eurozone and OECD countries as a two way process: where flows from 
BRICS can have a significant effect on growth rates and employment in the Eurozone and 
OECD. 
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Graph 9: Remittances Inflows, World Bank Data 
 
Graph 10 shows that with regard to outflows of remittances the United States continues to 
be the largest source for remittances and while there has been a slight reduction in the 
contributions in 2010 and 2011, it continues to provide the largest absolute amount in both 
these years. These results differ from the estimates for all developing countries, particularly 
for low income countries, where there was a fall in remittances from the US. 
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Graph 2: Remittances outflows, World Bank data 
The negative transmission mechanisms associated with falling remittances need to 
examined in relation to individual country characteristics. In the case of India, the 
comparison of the set of remittance figures with that of trade in services for the Indian 
economy provide indication of two differently directed flows. The importance of services is 
indicative of income earned by Indian nationals by providing services to other countries, 
while operating within the domestic economy. In contrast, remittances figures provide an 
estimate of the earnings from overseas, being sent into the domestic economy of India. 
These differently-directed flows, the former in trade and the latter in financial transfers, is 
another indication of how different data series need to simultaneously scrutinised to 
understand how there could be different possibilities of correcting the financial crisis in the 
Eurozone. The provision of services ($218 billion in 2012) and software exports ($62 billion 
in 2012), that have not fallen throughout the crisis (Reserve Bank of India) could be the 
result of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies in India that made a marginally positive 
contribution to the correction and adjustment impetus to the OECD, particularly US, and 
Eurozone regions. In contrast, the remittance flows that are still healthy for both the 
Chinese and Indian economies do not appear to be holding up due to correction and 
adjustment in the Eurozone.  
The limited evidence, however patchy, on Indian FDI also indicates that it would be 
pertinent for global datasets used by international financial organisations such as the World 
Bank and OECD to provide consolidated tables for outward FDI as increasingly significant 
flow that impacts on the Eurozone, could continue to counter the falling employment levels 
in the Eurozone by providing increased investment.  
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Implications of the Commentary 
The significant difference between the conventional analysis of the financial crisis in the 
Eurozone on developing countries and the political and descriptive statistical analysis 
provided by this commentary indicates that it is no longer useful to work with a conceptual 
model that regards the impact of the Eurozone crisis at homogenous on all developing 
countries.  
The case of India illustrates the significance of specific trade and financial relationships with 
Eurozone countries. The Eurozone countries are important trade partners and source of 
services and investment. India is also increasing its presence as outward FDI to the 
Eurozone.  This new pattern of growth where India’s growth and investment has 
implications for individual countries in the Eurozone indicate that the BRICS countries are 
increasing their economic impact of advanced economies. The ability of these countries, 
previously regarded as the periphery to have a significant impact, and even change the 
growth rates of countries at the centre is an important structural feature in the changing 
nature of global growth and its relationships to the current financial crisis.  
The early commentaries on the impact of the Eurozone on developing countries did not 
disaggregate the evaluation to individual countries, not even for the BRICS despite evidence 
that China was a significant player in the 2000s.  The need to recognise that China, and now 
India, are capable of changing the characteristics of growth and employment in the 
advanced economies is a major lesson coming out of both more recent reviews of the 
financial crisis as well as the result of our descriptive statistics.   
The more difficult problem that emerges from our analysis is that the overtly political nature 
of the negotiations that led to the formation of the European common market as well as the 
recent construction of the Eurozone in 1999 have not been explicitly discussed in the 
literature on the impact of the financial crisis and the Eurozone on developing countries.  
The evidence that these cooperative actions were developed to reduce the political costs of 
future war and fallout needs to be brought to the centre stage as Eurozone countries try 
and find a solution to the current crisis. The intransigence of Germany and France to come 
to an economic solution that is based on a building a political solution that prevents a 
breakdown of the Eurozone arises due to their unwillingness to recall the mechanics behind 
the negotiations of the 1940s, including the cost of the Marshall Plan. The need to put in 6-
10 per cent of the combined GDPs of France and Germany to ensure such a political pact 
does not seem too high a price to pay if once does revisit the 1940s and its results for 
creating a Golden Age.  
The current terms of income reduction and the associated fiscal squeeze has forced a very 
high degree of austerity on countries such as Greece. This extreme condition of austerity 
might be counterproductive as it could further reduce confidence within these countries. 
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Rather than the extreme fiscal measures resulting in a correction in the economic 
fundamentals this could result in protests on the streets due to the further reduction in 
employment caused by extreme fiscal reduction. The fundamental structural problem that 
faces Eurozone countries needs to be addressed head on- the case of the German banks and 
their need for returns on investment needs to be explicitly recognised as a political reality. 
The continued drumming out of existing economic instruments cannot bring about a 
correction in the financial crisis in the Eurozone. There needs to be a revisiting of the 
original rationale for the Eurozone and an explicit analysis of the political price of not 
ensuring an adjustment.  
To provide a serious answer to the question of when the Eurozone crisis will end in relation 
to the impact on India, the beginnings of a solution lies in the new balance of inflows and 
outflows that India has with individual countries in the Eurozone.  The examination of 
disaggregated trade and services balances, and the undertaking of a fuller analysis of the 
current account with key movements complemented by introducing an analysis the capital 
account of the Indian economy would be the first statistical step. The second new feature 
would be an explicit recognition of the political dimensions involved in not taking on board 
the evidence that BRICS are playing an increasing significant role in the economic growth 
story of advanced economies. The future willingness to admit the explicitly political nature 
of international flows and transmissions mechanisms will also be helpful in building 
negotiations within the Eurozone that fully calculate the political costs of not building a 
cooperative solution to the current economic crisis. The under-pricing of risk that was 
evident in the early 2000s was the direct consequence of disregarding the political demands 
made by both governments and large corporate players in the OECD and Eurozone 
countries. If these political costs continue to be undervalued, even dismissed, then it will be 
a very long time before we have a solution, taking it far beyond the end of the tenure of the 
current head of India’s central bank.   
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